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ABSTRACT 
At the national level, dozens of African countries have pledged to implement the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). This African-led plan aims to stimulate agriculture on the 
continent to achieve the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of halving poverty and hunger by 
2015. To do so, countries are expected to pursue 6 percent average annual agriculture growth at the 
national level, allocate 10 percent of national budgets to the agricultural sector, and improve overall 
policy efficiency through peer-review and accountability. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate trends 
in agricultural development, performance, and spending in Africa and to track corresponding progress in 
key poverty and hunger indicators following the recent food price crisis. The reason for tracking this 
information is that the recent food price crisis has the potential to derail the progress made toward 
reducing poverty and hunger in many African countries. This paper draws on policy research results in 
the literature to highlight some of the strategic policy options available to African governments for 
accelerating agricultural growth in line with the principles of CAADP. In this regard, the paper provides 
information on CAADP’s agenda by reviewing the progress of implementation and performance against a 
number of key benchmarks.   
Keywords: CAADP, Millennium Development Goals, food prices, African agriculture, trends, 
expenditures  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture is crucial for development in Africa, because the majority of the population lives in rural 
areas and at least 70 percent of the workforce is engaged in agriculture. In many African countries, 
growth in agriculture is the most effective strategy for reducing poverty and promoting overall economic 
growth (Diao et al. 2007).  
The period covered in this paper was, in many ways, a positive year for African agriculture. The 
G8 Summit, held in July 2009 in Italy, recognized the importance of agriculture for development and the 
critical need to increase financial and technical support to global agriculture and food security amid 
emerging challenges, such as the global economic crisis. Leaders at the summit issued an official 
statement on global food insecurity and pledged to mobilize US$20 billion to tackle the issue in the next 
three years. At the national level, dozens of African countries have pledged to implement the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). This African-led plan aims to stimulate 
agriculture on the continent in order to achieve the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of 
halving poverty and hunger by 2015. To do so, countries are expected to pursue 6 percent average annual 
agriculture growth at the national level, allocate 10 percent of national budgets to the agricultural sector, 
and improve overall policy efficiency through peer review and accountability.  
In addition, many African governments are now allocating more resources to agriculture. At the 
continental level, the share of agricultural spending in governments’ total expenditures has increased by 
75 percent between 2000 and 2005 with eight African countries allocating at least 10 percent of their 
budgets to the sector. Economic growth has also increased in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), from an annual 
average of approximately 3 percent in the 1990s and early 2000s to nearly 5 percent from 2005 to 2008. 
Agricultural growth has also spread to more countries (Badiane 2008). Between 2001 and 2003, only five 
countries—Angola, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, and Sudan—had achieved agricultural growth rates at 
or above 6 percent. By 2005, the number had grown to nine countries: Angola, Burkina Faso, Republic of 
the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Senegal. In 2007, seven countries met 
the CAADP targeted 6 percent agricultural growth rate and 10 countries met it in 2008. In addition, actual 
cereal output has increased recently, partly in response to higher food prices. This increase is projected to 
continue in 2010. 
Yet these positive signs over the past few years have been coupled with increased volatility and 
uncertainty in agricultural markets. The food crisis, which propelled international food prices to triple 
their 2003 levels, peaked in mid-2008. Then prices fell dramatically in the latter half of that year, as the 
international recession set in. These back-to-back crises have left poor farmers in Africa at the mercy of 
increased price volatility and have given them less access to resources, credit, and social protection. 
Moreover, as this paper shows, the food price crisis has the potential to derail the progress made toward 
reducing poverty and hunger in many African countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate trends in agricultural development, performance, and 
spending in Africa and to track corresponding progress in key poverty and hunger indicators following 
the recent food price crisis. This paper also draws on policy research results in the literature to highlight 
some of the strategic policy options available to African governments for accelerating agricultural growth 
in line with CAADP’s principles. In this regard, the paper provides information on the CAADP agenda by 
reviewing the progress of implementation and performance against a number of key benchmarks. The 
paper begins by reviewing recent trends in agricultural development over the past year, including progress 
with CAADP process and challenges posed by volatile food prices. It then reviews resource flows to the 
agricultural sector by governments and donors and reviews whether these flows have been of sufficient 
quantity and quality. The paper goes on to report recent agricultural and economic performance 
indicators, including growth, agricultural productivity, and trade trends, before reviewing recent progress 
made at the regional and national levels toward poverty reduction and hunger alleviation in the context of 
volatile prices since 2008. The paper concludes with policy recommendations and a summary of overall 
trends.  
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2.  RECENT TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
Progress in the Agricultural Sector: Implementation of the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
Although several challenges to the agriculture sector in Africa and the world emerged from 2008 to early 
2009, there were significant gains, in particular at the institutional and political levels. The African Union 
(AU) adopted CAADP in June 2003 at the AU Summit in Maputo, Mozambique. The CAADP 
framework sets the achievement of 6 percent annual agricultural growth as its main goal. Attendees also 
acknowledged that inadequate investment in the sector was a key constraint on agricultural productivity 
and growth rates. Thus, African governments pledged to increase agricultural spending to at least 10 
percent of total government budgetary resources by 2008. These commitments explicitly placed public 
agricultural spending at the center of national growth and poverty-reduction strategies. These strategies 
are aimed at putting countries on track toward achieving the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) 
of halving poverty and hunger by 2015.  
At the country level, CAADP implementation is primarily a process of aligning national 
agricultural policies, strategies, and investments with CAADP principles and targets. The process builds 
on each country’s ongoing efforts and is led by national governments and key stakeholders, with 
coordination by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the secretariat of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the AU. Each country, in collaboration with key partners and 
experts, conducts several tasks that lead to a Roundtable meeting. Then the country signs its own CAADP 
compact, which specifies long-term investment commitments for agricultural growth and development 
(NEPAD 2005). The steps include  
1.  taking stock of the country’s ongoing agricultural development efforts and identifying gaps 
that need to be filled to help increase growth and reduce poverty and hunger;  
2.  specifying the strategic options for and sources of poverty-reducing growth to guide long-
term development efforts in the agricultural sector;  
3.  estimating long-term funding needs to exploit the growth and poverty-reduction potential 
associated with the identified options and sources of growth; and 
4.  identifying review, dialogue, and knowledge mechanisms to facilitate the transition toward 
evidence-based and outcome-oriented strategy planning and implementation, thereby 
ensuring better outcomes.  
Since CAADP’s ratification, dozens of countries have begun the implementation process; sixteen 
of those countries—Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Uganda—have signed their CAADP country 
compacts and are now moving on to the post-compact stages (Figure 1). Several other countries are 
scheduled to sign their CAADP compacts in 2010.  
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Source: Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) 2009, http://www.nepad.caadp.net 2009. 
Threats to the Agricultural Sector: High and Volatile Food Prices 
The year 2008 was one of extreme variability for international food prices. In the first half of the year, 
prices increased for nearly every agricultural commodity (von Braun 2008a). For instance, “at their peaks 
in the second quarter of 2008, world prices of wheat and maize were three times higher than at the 
beginning of 2003, and the price of rice was five times higher” (von Braun 2008a, 1). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reported that as of mid-2008, the global food price 
index had shot up nearly 40 percent from the previous year (FAO 2008b). This climb in global food 
prices was driven by increases of 60 to 165 percent in the prices of key crops, such as maize, wheat, 
soybeans, and rice during the same period (Figure 2). Oil prices also rose sharply. 
Starting in mid- to late-2008, international food price levels fell by 30 to 40 percent (von Braun 
2008a). However, these declines do not appear to have been sufficient enough to return prices to their 
prespike levels, as shown in Figure 2. Although there was a small production response to the higher 
prices, these reductions in food prices occurred farther and faster than can be explained through 
production gains alone. Rather, the price slide can be explained by other factors, such as the financial 
crisis, the fall in crude oil prices, and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar (FAO 2008b). Rather than 
returning global food markets back to normal, the price slide’s arrival on the heels of the price spike, 
along with the declining availability of credit and employment, has actually made food security more 
precarious. The dominant characteristic of agricultural markets is now price uncertainty.  
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Figure 2. Trends in real international prices of key cereals: First quarter 2005 to second quarter 
2009 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2008. Data are deflated by the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. 
Notes: Q1 = First quarter; Q2 = Second quarter 
Causes of the 2008 Food Price Crisis 
The rapid surge in the prices of key staples prompted a great deal of concern in developing countries and 
the international community, as well as an urgent search for the causes. Although accounts differ as to 
which factors were the leading causes, most international experts broadly agree with the “perfect storm” 
hypothesis—that a range of interacting factors caused the price surge. These factors include 
•  rapid growth in demand from China and India, 
•  financial market speculation, 
•  hoarding (export restrictions),  
•  weather shocks, 
•  depreciation of the U.S. dollar, 
•  rising oil prices, 
•  biofuels,  
•  agricultural productivity decline, and 
•  decline of stocks. 
Figure 3 provides some summary evidence that is broadly consistent with the causes listed above. 
Oil prices were the first to rise, which, in turn, made biofuels profitable, leading to a rise in the price of 





























































































































































prices in 2006, but other prices were mostly stable. In 2007, however, rising oil and fertilizer costs 
contributed to rising production costs, and price increases in maize and land reallocation from soybeans to 
maize undoubtedly induced substitution price effects. The major change in 2008 was the advent of export 
bans and panic buying in international markets, especially in rice. Meanwhile, fertilizer and oil costs rose 
in the first half of 2008. In the second half of 2008, the food price bubble burst, major harvests were much 
improved, and the financial crisis set in. All of these factors contributed to a sharp fall in prices. 
Figure 3. The timing of commodity price rises and their associated causes, 2005–2008 
 
Source: Headey and Fan 2008. 
The Impact of the 2008 Global Good Crisis in Africa 
The rise in international food prices understandably caused considerable concern around the globe. This 
concern was certainly evident in Africa for several reasons. First, as the world’s poorest region, Africa 
already suffers from high rates of malnutrition (see Section 4), which makes the impact of any reductions 
in food consumption much more severe. Second, the typical African household spends 50 to 70 percent of 
its budget on food (von Braun, et al. 2008). Third, although Africa is mostly rural, low agricultural 
productivity means that many rural African households may still be net food consumers rather than net 
producers. Add to that the fact that Africa’s urban population has soared in recent decades, particularly in 
countries like Nigeria, and it is clear that many Africans are highly vulnerable to food inflation (von 
Braun 2008b). Because many countries have been unable to meet domestic demand for food, social unrest 
and riots have ensued in places such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, and Senegal 
(Ngongi 2008). And yet in other countries, the transmission of high international food prices has been 
minimal. 
The reasons for this variation in the effects of rising international food prices are quite complex. 
African countries differ greatly in the following: 
•  agricultural production (staples versus cash crops) 
•  the number of net food consumers 
•  dietary diversity 
•  dependence on cereals in general and cereal imports in particular 
•  the extent to which the cost of higher food imports has been offset by rising commodity 
exports and ample foreign reserves 
oil>$60/barrel  
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•  the ability of African governments to mitigate the transmission of international prices into 
domestic markets through exchange rate adjustments or tariff reductions  
•  the extent to which local events interact with global food inflation 
Domestic Food Prices 
National and regional factors have also been important in driving domestic food prices. The degree to 
which a country’s or region’s markets are integrated with global markets can determine how much of the 
international price spike is transmitted to local markets (Benson et al. 2008). If a country is isolated, then 
the global food crisis is likely to have a limited direct impact on that country.  
Regional analyses carried out by research partners of the Regional Strategic Analysis and 
Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) network on domestic food prices indicate that high international 
prices were slow to transmit to both Eastern and Southern Africa and that many countries had not yet 
experienced the subsequent decrease in food prices (Macharia et al. 2009; Minde, Chilonda, and Sally 
2008).  
In 2008 in Eastern and Southern Africa, domestic food prices increased with some variation 
across countries, although the rate at which food prices increased was slower than the international rate. 
In this region, the countries with the smallest food price index increase were Malawi (11 percent), Zambia 
(13 percent), and Tanzania (13 percent). These three countries were significant food exporters during this 
period, but each recently introduced maize export bans, which may have shielded them from external 
price increases. Namibia and South Africa experienced medium increases in domestic food prices 
compared to their neighbors throughout the Southern African region. Although Namibia is a large food 
importer, it produces a large portion of its needs for grains. Therefore, compared to other Southern 
African countries, it experienced a moderate domestic price increase of 17 percent. Likewise, prices in 
South Africa increased by 16 percent, probably due to the counteracting effects of its large and stable 
food economy on the one hand and its depreciating currency on the other. The country in this region that 
experienced the largest domestic food price increase was Lesotho (20 percent), which is heavily reliant on 
imported food. 
Local policies and events also contributed to the variable effects across African countries. For 
example, in Ethiopia, droughts and monetary policies contributed to food inflation, whereas civil conflict 
was a primary cause in Kenya. Ghana also experienced a high rate of inflation, although this was not 
chiefly due to food inflation. In mineral-exporting countries, inflation may have been high due to both 
food inflation (because of food imports) and nonfood inflation associated with rising commodity prices. 
In contrast to these select African countries, general inflation in much of the rest of Africa was actually 
quite low (Figure 4). Considering that food can make up as much as 50 percent of the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) bundle in African countries, the CPI is a good clue for food price trends in Africa, especially 
in the absence of longer term data.  
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Figure 4. Average annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation, January 2005 to July 2008 
 
Source: IMF 2008.  
Notes: Inflation is calculated until July 2008 wherever possible. * Indicates that the regional group excludes any countries that 
are listed individually or in the mineral exporter category—that is, “West and Central Africa” excludes Nigeria, Ghana, and 
Sierra Leone, and “East Africa” excludes Kenya and Ethiopia. **The five mineral exporters are Nigeria, Zambia, Botswana, 
Angola, and Sierra Leone (thought the last is only a moderate exporter). 
More commodity-specific urban food price data collected by U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID) Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) also suggest that the 
impact of rising food prices varied across Africa. Figure 5 shows the percentage change in nominal urban 
retail prices of maize.
1
                                                       
1 Because the prices are not deflated by a nonfood Consumer Price Index (CPI), it could be argued that these figures 
overstate the real price rise, but the exaggeration is probably only slight. 
 In about one-quarter of the countries for which data are available, prices rose by 
10 to 15 percent, which is actually a sizeable rise, given that many Africans heavily consume maize. In 
another quarter of the countries, sample maize prices rose by around 7 percent, and in another quarter, 
they rose by about 5 percent; in the remaining countries, prices were steady. In a few countries, maize 
prices rose at even higher rates. For example, maize prices rose by 32 percent in Zambia, 65 percent in 
Mozambique, and more than 100 percent in Malawi and Tanzania. 
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Figure 5. Percentage change in nominal retail maize prices in urban centers, 2008 
 
Source: Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) 2009.  
Note: * The data for these countries apply from mid-2007 to mid-2008, rather than for the calendar year 2008. 
Figure 6 looks at these same statistics for rice, which is imported more heavily than maize. Rice 
prices in the countries shown in Figure 6 generally rose by less than the increase in maize prices, despite 
experiencing larger international price increases. One reason for this is that the international price 
increases for rice were relatively short lived compared to those for maize. Indeed, international rice prices 
peaked in the middle of 2008 but declined rapidly thereafter, so the worst few months of 2008 may not 
actually be reflected in Figure 6. In addition, rice has domestic substitutes, including some domestically 
produced rice varieties and other staple foods, which may have dampened the international price 
transmission to domestic markets. Another reason is that some countries reduced or removed tariffs on 
rice imports. Nigeria, for example, removed a 100 percent tax on rice imports. Hence, through 
government policies and market forces, some countries were able to buffer the international price rise. 


















Figure 6. Percentage change in nominal rice prices in urban centers, 2008 
 
Source: FEWSNET 2009.  
Note: * The data for these countries apply from mid-2007 to mid-2008, rather than the calendar year 2008. 
Policy Options 
A range of short-, medium-, and long-term policy options are available to governments. However, finding 
the right mix of measures that do not counteract one another is difficult. For example, restricting food 
exports to conserve domestic supplies may protect the poor by capping local food prices, but it denies 
local farmers access to profitable external outlets for their crops. Therefore, the challenge for 
governments rests in identifying and implementing policies that protect the poor from price increases 
while also stimulating food production in the long run. 
Most experts now recommend a two-level approach to this challenge. This approach focuses on 
(1) short-term coping strategies that protect the poor without distorting the domestic food economy and 
(2) long-term “resilience” measures that allow farmers to take advantage of production incentives, while 
also stabilizing the economy to prevent vulnerability to future crises and price variability.
2
Without continued and increased investments to the agricultural sector, the food crisis could 
return with a vengeance. According to a report by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), if agricultural investments taper off due to shrinking available credit, food production will 
contract even further, which could lead to future food price spikes (von Braun 2008a). However, this 
time, because poor people are making lower wages (due to the decreased production that accompanies a 
recession), the effects will be more severe. If, however, agricultural investments are maintained during the 
recession, IFPRI researchers found that developing countries could avoid many of the negative effects of 
slower growth.  
 Donors can 
help “African countries meet the higher foreign exchange and budgetary resource requirements, while 
avoiding distortionary interventions in the sector” (Badiane 2008, 4).  
In addition to long-term funding for agriculture, the African continent needs expanded 
intraregional trade in food commodities. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will likely differ in their 
exposure to international food prices. Recent trends indicate that some countries will not register large 
direct impacts of food price rises, either because much of their population relies on nontradable staples 
(such as cassava in Mozambique) or because they are not fully integrated into global food markets. For 
                                                       
2 See, for instance, Badiane 2008; Minde, Chilonda, and Sally 2008; von Braun 2008a; and von Braun et al. 2008. 













these countries which have a degree of “natural protection” from conditions in global markets, regional 
markets will be increasingly important (Minde, Chilonda, and Sally 2008). 
Responses of Donors and Governments 
As a response to the crisis, international donors pledged more than US$12 billion in development aid at 
the June 2008 FAO summit (von Braun 2008a). However, with the sudden onslaught of the financial 
crisis, only US$1 billion has been doled out (Montero 2008). Moreover, donors merely directed more 
funds to food aid relief and away from longer-term development goals (Badiane 2008). 
Box 1. Examples of gove rnment responses to high food prices
3
In Africa, as in other regions of the world, the initial response to the food price increases has 
generally been a protective one (Box 1). The focus has been on ensuring the availability of local food, 
keeping a lid on consumer prices, and supporting the most vulnerable members of the population. These 
tactics have largely been considered coping mechanisms, however, rather than efforts to encourage an 
adequate supply response. The two most frequently used policies in Africa in response to high food prices 
have been reduced taxes on food grains (used in more than 40 percent of African countries) and price 
controls or consumer subsidies (used in more than 30 percent of African countries). Other measures 
include export bans and stock drawdowns. All of these measures are short term and fairly unsustainable. 
Moreover, they could exacerbate the crisis because they may discourage a production response, while also 
making the international food market smaller and more volatile (Ngongi 2008; FAO 2008b).  
 
   
                                                       
3 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2008; World Bank 2008; Benson et al. 2008; FAO 2008b. 
In Eastern Africa, Ethiopia banned exports of the main cereals and grain stockpiling and 
suspended the World Food Programme’s (WFP) local purchases for emergency interventions. 
The government also imposed a temporary 10 percent surtax on luxury imports to fund food 
subsidy interventions, including the distribution of subsidized wheat to low-income urban 
households. Congo reduced the rate of the value-added tax (VAT) on basic imported foodstuffs 
from 18 to 5 percent. Kenya allowed up to 270,000 tons of duty-free maize imports from South 
Africa and removed sales taxes on rice and bread. The government also reduced the import tax on 
wheat from 35 to 10 percent. 
In Southern Africa, South Africa has planned adjustments to the amounts paid in social grants 
to the poor so as to mitigate the impact of rising food prices. In Zambia, following seasonal 
floods, and despite a large exportable surplus of maize in the 2007/08 marketing year 
(May/April), the government reinstated the export ban applicable for any new contracts. 
Zimbabwe continues to control imports of maize, wheat, and sorghum, which are sold at 
subsidized prices. Although an early import contract of 400,000 tons of maize from Malawi 
partially mitigated the increase in import prices this year, domestic consumer price inflation, 
measured at more than 26,000 percent in November 2007, drastically eroded the Zimbabwean 
consumers’ purchasing power.  
In Western Africa, Benin and Senegal enacted price controls and waived tariffs. Ghana 
eliminated all import duties on rice, wheat, yellow corn, and vegetable oil and provided free 
tractors and fertilizer subsidies for farmers. Liberia completely banned all food exports in May 
2008. Nigeria suspended tariffs on rice imports for six months in May 2008.  
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Gender Aspects of the Food Crisis 
Men and women are likely to be affected by the food crisis differently. According to IFPRI research, 
women are less able to cope with and overcome crises of all kinds, because they have less access to and 
control over resources and assets (Quisumbing, Meinzen-Dick, and Bassett 2008). Rising prices can then 
have repercussions for the entire household, as women face greater time constraints because they have to 
travel farther to find cheaper, but more labor-intensive, foods to prepare. Moreover, women are often the 
“shock absorbers” for threats to household food security, sacrificing their own nutrition for the benefit of 
others in the home. At the same time, gender conflicts and negotiations within the household may limit 
the household’s ability to increase production, thereby hindering its ability to benefit from higher prices. 
All of these factors must be considered in assessing the impact of the food crisis. 
Conclusions 
African agriculture has indeed made progress, despite facing immense challenges in dealing with global 
uncertainties following the food price of 2008 and the financial crisis of 2009. For example, African 
countries have made considerable progress in designing, implementing, and monitoring agricultural and 
rural development strategies as they strive to align with the CAADP agenda. Since 2008, over a dozen 
African countries signed their CAADP country compacts, with several additional countries scheduled to 
sign by mid 2010.  
The food price hikes in Africa in 2008 were fairly similar to those experienced in the rest of the 
world, with the exception of “sticky” domestic prices in some countries. This means that some prices did 
not increase at the same rate as international prices and that some have yet to come back down, as 
international prices generally have. Nevertheless, the greatest trend has been price volatility across and 
within African countries, which is harmful due to the uncertainty it creates in agricultural markets. This 
volatility has also resulted in a mismatch between input and output prices for farmers who invested in 
their production during the price upswing (when inputs were expensive) and who are now harvesting and 
trying to sell their goods during a price downswing.  
The food price crisis has generally had negative welfare effects on the African population, 
because few farmers have had the opportunity to benefit from the higher prices through increased 
production. The financial crisis and international economic slowdown have exacerbated the food crisis 
situation, rather than remedied it. These two events have shrunk the amount of capital available for 
investment in agriculture, shrunk employment and wages, and decreased the amount of credit available 
for farmers. Under these current trends, it is possible that a larger, more harmful food crisis could be 
triggered in the near future.  
Given these challenges, it is only that much more imperative that the CAADP implementation 
process move forward to better prepare countries against such future shocks. There is a need for countries 
and donors alike to strengthen the resilience of agriculture and rural economies in Africa. This task will 
require higher, consistent, and effective resource allocation to the sector in order to increase agricultural 
growth, food security, and stability. The next section reviews trends in expenditures to African agriculture 
by governments and donors.   
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3.  INVESTMENT AND RESOURCE FLOWS TO AFRICAN AGRICULTURE 
From the 1990s to the early 2000s, both donor and government allocations to agriculture were low. In 
some countries, this fact remains true. However, there is now renewed interest in allocating more 
resources to the sector, particularly to meet the 10 percent budgetary allocation target of CAADP. This 
section discusses recent trends in agricultural funding in Africa and the efficiency of resource use. 
Tracking Government Expenditures on Agriculture in Africa  
The latest evidence shows that since 1980, agricultural spending as a share of total spending in Africa has 
ranged from 4 to 6 percent on aggregate (Johnson et al. 2008). Thus, African countries as a whole did not 
meet the CAADP 10 percent budgetary allocation target by 2008. Despite a 75 percent increase in the 
share of agricultural spending from 2000 to 2005, the target remains unmet because of the low initial base 
prior to 2000. Only eight countries—Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and 
Zimbabwe—reached or surpassed 10 percent (see Table 1 and Figure 7). Nine of the reporting countries 
reached expenditure shares between 5 and 10 percent, whereas 28 countries devoted less than 5 percent of 
their total budgets to the sector.  
Table 1. Level of government agriculture expenditure as a share of total government expenditure, 
2008 (unless otherwise noted) 
At least 10 percent  5 percent to less than 10 percent  Less than 5 percent 


















2  Central African Republic
2 




3  Congo, Dem. Republic
2 
  Zimbabwe
2  Congo, Republic
3 






    Egypt
3 













   
Madagascar
2 
   
Mauritius 
   
Morocco
3 
   
Mozambique
2 
   
Nigeria 
   
Rwanda
3 
   
Seychelles 
   
Sierra Leone
3 
   
Swaziland
2 
   
Tanzania 
   
Uganda 
   
Zambia
2 
Sources: Based on ReSAKSS data collected from various national government sources and IMF 2009. 
Notes: 1. Estimate for 2009; 2. 2007; 3. 2006; 4. 2005; 5. 2004   
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Figure 7. Agriculture expenditures and the CAADP 10% target, 2008 (unless otherwise noted) 
 
Since the 2003 Maputo Declaration, many African governments have increased their budgetary 
allocations to the agriculture sector. In 2003, only 5.9 percent of African countries were spending at least 
10 percent of their total budget allocations on agriculture. This figure increased to 15.2 percent in 
200735.7 percent in 2008 (Figure 8). Many of the countries that have increased their spending allocations 
since 2003 have progressed from the range of 5 to 10 percent spending to greater than 10 percent 
spending. In addition, a number of countries have increased their allocations from less than 5 percent to 
between 5 and 10 percent, including The Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo. This upward trend 
may indicate that some countries are responding to the Maputo Declaration’s target. Nevertheless, the 
majority of African countries have generally stayed in the same grouping of budgetary allocation, 
especially those countries with initially low spending rates.  
Figure 8. Progress toward 10 % agricultural expenditure share, 2002–2008 
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An alternative measure for the priority given to agriculture, other than agricultural expenditures 
as a share of total expenditures, is the ratio of agricultural expenditures to agricultural GDP. This measure 
of government spending on agriculture explicitly weighs the size of the sector in the overall economy 
when comparing across countries. For example, 10 percent of total spending may translate into a 5 
percent share of agricultural GDP for countries in which the sector is large and, therefore, important to the 
national economy. In other cases, 10 percent of total spending may translate into a 15 percent share of 
agricultural GDP for countries in which the agricultural sector is less important. Botswana, for example, 
has barely spent 5 percent of total expenditures on the sector since 1980, yet it represents more than 60 
percent as a share of agricultural GDP (see Table 2 and Figure 9). 
Table 2. Level of agricultural investment as a share of agricultural GDP, 2006 (unless otherwise 
noted) 
At least 10%  5% to less than 10%  Less than 5% 
Botswana
1  Burkina Faso  Benin
2 
Zambia  Egypt  Cameroon 
Zimbabwe  Ethiopia  Cote d’Ivoire
1 
  Mali  Ghana 
  Niger  Kenya 
 
  Malawi 




  Rwanda 
   
Togo
1 
   
Uganda 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2008, except for  Malawi figures from Benin, Thurlow, Diao, McCool and Simtowe 
2008 and Zambia figures from Benin, Thurlow, Diao, Kalinda and Kalinda 2008.  
Notes: 1. 2007; 2. 2008.The ratio of agricultural expenditures to agricultural GDP is low in Africa when compared with Asia. On 
aggregate, Africa spent between 5 and 7 percent as a share of agricultural GDP, whereas Asia spent between 8 and 10 percent. 
With the exception of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, African countries have spent less than 10 percent of their agricultural 
GDPs on agriculture in recent decades. Yet, country-level data show that the range can be considerable. For example, Botswana 
had the highest percentage in 2005 at 60 percent, while Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana spent less than 2 percent in the same year.  
The inability of African countries to substantially raise the level of their agricultural investments 
may have serious implications for poverty reduction and food security. Recent estimates indicate that in 
order to achieve MDG1, the continent will need to boost agricultural spending by US$13.6 billion 2007 
dollars annually from 2008 to 2015, with a cumulative total of US$95.7 billion (Fan, Johnson, Saurkar, 
and Makombe 2008).
4
                                                       
4 This total excludes Zimbabwe as an outlier and is based on a sample of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 This suggests that the continent will need to increase its agricultural spending by at 
least 20 percent per year.   
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Figure 9. Agricultural expenditure as a share of agricultural GDP, 2006 (unless otherwise noted) 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2008, except for  Malawi figures from Benin, Thurlow, Diao, McCool and Simtowe 
2008 and Zambia figures from Benin, Thurlow, Diao, Kalinda and Kalinda 2008.  
Resource Efficiency 
As governments increase their budgetary allocations to agriculture, it is important to further examine the 
quality of this spending. How are governments allocating these funds? Are these funds coming from 
government sources or from donors? Is spending diverging from allocations? To better understand the 
causes of poor agricultural investment ratios in Africa, three country case studies are drawn from here: 
Malawi, Zambia, and Nigeria (Govereh et al. 2009; Mogues et al. 2008; and Njiwa et al. 2008).  
Agricultural spending has been increasing in all three countries since 2000, with Malawi even 
surpassing the CAADP’s 10 percent target in recent years (Figure 10).  
Figure 10. Agriculture expenditure share of total expenditures in Malawi, Zambia, and Nigeria, 
2000–2008 
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In Malawi and Zambia, the majority of this increase in agriculture spending has come from 
government sources as opposed to donors (Figure 11 and Figure 12). In Zambia, fiscal dependence on 
development partners for agricultural spending declined, from 48 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2008. 
Likewise, in Malawi, the donor share of total government spending on agriculture declined from 41 
percent in 2000 to 23 percent in 2007, with a low of 12 percent in 2006. Although this is a positive 
development for sustainability and independence from aid, there could be a need for donors to increase 
their support for agriculture.  
Figure 11. Source of agriculture spending in Malawi, 2000–2007 
 
Source: Njiwa et al. 2008. 
Figure 12. Source of agriculture spending in Zambia, 2000–2008 
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The overwhelming trend for these four countries (Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia) is that 
they are all investing primarily in one particular program. For instance, Ghana has focused on one 
particular crop (cocoa), whereas Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia have invested most heavily in input 
support (Table 3). Yet input support is a short-run distributive program; although it will have short-term 
productivity gains, it will not have the longer term results that agricultural research or irrigation 
investments would have.
5
Table 3. Composition of agriculture spending 
 A single subsector-dominant investment strategy is unlikely to yield desirable 
outcomes on its own. This pattern raises concerns about the sustainability and balance of agriculture 











Price support         20.2  
Inputs       43.5   39.7  
Food security     50.5   22.0    
Livestock       2.7   3.3  
Fishery     3.2     1.1  
Crops, livestock, and fishery (aggregate)   23.7        
Forestry   3.5   7.3     4.1  
Cocoa   62.2        
Research and extension   10.6   13.0     21.7  
Sources: Benin, Thurlow, Diao, Kalinda and Kalinda 2008; Benin, Thurlow, Diao, McCool and Simtowe 2008;  
Mogues et al. 2008; Njiwa et al. 2008; Govereh et al. 2009. 
The ratio of actual spending to budgeted spending, or the investment gap ratio, is a measure of 
how efficiently resources are being used. The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 
best-practice standard is a maximum of a 3 percent discrepancy between budgeted and actual 
expenditures, which is equal to a ratio of 97 percent (Mogues et al. 2008). If a country’s ratio exceeds 97 
percent, it suggests that the government is underutilizing approved funds, which could be a symptom of 
capacity problems. If the ratio is greater than 100 percent, it is indicative of government overspending.  
Inefficient budget execution may negatively affect policy planning, design, and implementation 
and can make it difficult to attain goals and expected outcomes for projects and policies. One result of this 
inefficiency is that programs may have to change or end midstream if promised funding does not 
materialize. Extreme investment ratios also erode the credibility of a government’s claim that approved 
projects will actually be financed.  
Figure 13 shows the investment gap ratios of both Nigeria and Malawi for the past several years 
as compared with the PEFA standard ratio. From 2000 to 2004/5, both countries had poor budget 
execution, within a range of 48 to 85 percent. This means that up to 52 percent of budgeted resources for 
agriculture were not being spent. In contrast, in recent years, both countries have overspent the budgeted 
amount.  
                                                       
5 See, for example, Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse 2003 and Fan, Xhang, and Rao 2004.  
18 
Figure 13. Investment gap ratios in Nigeria and Malawi, 2000–2007 
 
Sources: Mogues et al. 2008; Njiwa et al. 2008; Govereh et al. 2009.  
Note: The PEFA target is considered the threshold below which the investment gap ratio indicates underutilization of funds. It is 
set at 97 percent. 
In both Nigeria and Malawi, the gap between budgeted agriculture spending and actual spending 
has largely been driven by deviations in capital outlays, rather than by recurrent spending. An exception is 
Malawi in recent years, which has witnessed a more stable development budget but which has been 
greatly overspending on the recurrent. Malawi’s recent overspending is largely due to overruns in the 
costs of the subsidy programs. Recurrent spending consists more of salaries and staff expenses, which 
means that once they are set, they do no usually change yearly. Projects, on the other hand, can be 
negotiated and can change frequently, making it hard to budget the line items from year to year (which 
leads to budget under execution). Another reason for poor budget execution is that budgets are formed 
based on the demands of constituencies, whereas fiscally restrained finance ministries often pare down 
implementation.  
Development Assistance to Agriculture  
From 1980 to 2006, development assistance to all developing countries has grown at an annual average 
rate of 5 percent. Total aid in these developing countries grew from US$7 billion in 1980 to US$27 
billion in 2006.  
In contrast to the increase in total aid to developing countries since 1980, agricultural aid to these 
countries fell dramatically in the 1990s. According to the FAO (2008b), from 1990 to 1999, total lending 
to agriculture worldwide from external sources fell by 50 percent. In Africa as a whole, donor spending 
for agriculture as a share of total donor spending saw a consistent decline, from an average of 15 percent 
between 1980 and 1995 to 12 percent between 2000 and 2002. In 2006, the ratio had declined to about 4 
percent. Total overseas development assistance (ODA) for agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa has hovered 
at US$1 billion a year since the 1990s. In comparison, the share of ODA spent on aid for emergencies has 
doubled and, in actual dollars, has more than quadrupled during the same period. 
All of the SSA countries in Table 4 spent less than 10 percent of their aid budgets on agriculture. 
Botswana and Nigeria spent less than 1 percent of all aid received on agriculture. However, Burkina Faso 
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their aid budgets on agriculture. Thus, agriculture has not been prominent in the agenda of many donors, 
perhaps not because of any conscious decisions but because of pressure to broaden their aid agendas.  
In addition, ODA for agriculture in some countries (such as Mozambique and Tanzania) greatly 
overshadows the amount spent by the government itself. These contributions risk “crowding out” 
domestic agriculture investments by reducing the government’s political incentives to increase their 
shares.  
Africa is now facing the same type of long-term food deficit problem that India faced in the early 
1960s. As a result of inadequate investment in the African agriculture sector, the continent’s overall 
agricultural productivity has fallen since the mid-1980s, leaving it vulnerable to frequent food crises and 
dependent on emergency food aid and food imports. In response to these food crises, governments and 
donors have devoted more resources to emergency aid than to long-term agricultural development, which 
further undermines the ability of countries to generate economic and agricultural growth. Although 
investment in agriculture has increased in recent years, a large and increasing share is still devoted to 
short-term food aid interventions (Figure 14 and Figure 15). Consequently, poverty and hunger persist 
and threaten the likelihood of some of the countries being able to reach the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).   
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Table 4. Agricultural aid to Africa, 2002–2008 
   Aid to agriculture (2007 constant dollars, million)        Agricultural aid as a percentage of total aid     
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Botswana  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  8.0  —  0.5  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.8  9.0  — 
Burkina Faso  22.0  35.4  33.7  35.6  44.5  58.5  7.7  3.2  4.5  4.6  4.4  5.2  2.6  0.8 
Cameroon  13.1  13.5  12.6  13.7  23.1  52.7  —  1.4  1.1  0.9  1.2  3.1  1.5  — 
Côte d’Ivoire  13.3  5.0  3.3  2.4  15.3  5.3  —  2.5  0.2  0.6  0.6  5.8  1.4  — 
Egypt  25.1  31.1  23.0  56.2  71.5  45.4  —  1.1  1.5  1.3  2.6  4.1  2.9  — 
Ethiopia  29.4  41.1  21.0  31.3  38.1  46.0  0.2  1.7  2.1  1.0  1.4  1.7  0.7  0.0 
Ghana  14.4  17.9 
 
25.5  41.1  38.7  51.1  0.0  1.2  1.5  1.9  1.6  2.1  0.8  0.0 
Kenya  21.8  22.3  23.6  19.1  43.9  52.2  7.1  2.4  2.9  2.7  2.1  4.4  4.5  0.5 
Malawi  10.1  21.0  14.9  38.1  26.9  47.2  —  1.4  3.5  2.1  5.7  3.6  1.5  — 
Mali  31.2  23.0  41.9  40.5  31.6  63.3  6.9  4.6  2.8  5.2  4.7  3.5  2.2  0.6 
Morocco  12.7  12.4  13.0  16.2  21.6  26.6  —  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.7  1.8  — 
Nigeria  3.5  5.5  3.5  7.9  6.7  7.4  —  1.1  1.2  0.8  1.1  0.1  0.1  — 
Togo  2.3  3.3  2.3  2.2  1.2  1.3  0.3  1.7  3.1  2.5  2.2  1.1  1.2  0.2 
Tunisia  16.0  16.6  14.2  13.0  15.0  11.4  —  1.8  2.5  2.3  2.2  2.5  1.6  — 
Uganda  11.7  18.7  33.4  38.1  56.6  57.0  7.2  0.8  1.5  2.4  2.4  3.9  1.1  0.4 
Zambia  21.2  16.3  13.7  29.9  37.0  39.8  3.1  1.7  1.1  1.0  1.8  1.7  0.8  0.3 








Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2009 
Figure 15. ODA commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa: Level and share to agriculture, 1995–2007 
 
 
Source: OECD 2009. Based on ODA commitments in 2007.  
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In response to the 2003 Maputo Declaration, many African governments and their development 
partners are increasing the quantity of agricultural spending. Donor spending has increased slightly, but 
not at the same rate as government spending. Although this is good for national independence, it calls for 
development partners to step up to their commitments. Without question, African governments and 
donors should increase their investments in the prime movers (human capital, technology, and 
institutional innovations) to increase farm production and accelerate agricultural growth. 
Simply increasing agricultural spending is only part of the picture, however. Rural poverty 
reduction cannot be achieved without agricultural growth, and neither is it likely to happen simply by 
investing in the agricultural sector alone. Setting the right priorities for public spending is equally 
important. Investment strategies must be unique to each country’s specific needs. Moreover, the quality of 
agricultural spending is also important. As this section has shown, although the investment gap ratio has 
been declining, more attention is still needed to improve program effectiveness. Based on a number of 
country case studies, government expenditures have focused largely on inputs (fertilizer and seeds) at the 
cost of investments that will have longer term impacts on productivity, such as agriculture research and 
development, irrigation, and rural infrastructure. Even more important, many countries need to improve 
the execution of their budgets in order to avoid any negative impacts on policy planning, design, and 
implementation, as well as to enable attainment of the development goals enshrined in the CAADP 
country compacts.  
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4.  EVALUATION OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PERFORMANCE  
With increased commitments and resources flowing to the agricultural sector, it is expected that 
performance in the sector will improve. This section will show that, in fact, agriculture’s performance on 
the African continent has been positive and improving in recent years, though direct attribution to 
increased investment as the main cause is still tenuous. Yet it is still difficult to estimate the full impact of 
the recent food price crisis and the onslaught of the financial crisis on agricultural performance. 
Therefore, more resources and detailed attention to the sector are needed to overcome the potential 
setbacks and to achieve the CAADP targets and MDGs.  
Economic and Agricultural Performance 
Over the past two decades, annual growth in both agricultural GDP and overall GDP increased 
substantially at the continental level in Africa (Figure 16). Although agricultural performance varies 
within and across African countries, recent trends indicate an increase in agricultural GDP growth at the 
continental and regional levels. Sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture GDP growth rate increased from an 
annual average of 3.0 percent in the 1990s and 2000s to 5.3 percent in 2008 (Table 5). A similar trend can 
be observed at the regional level. All regions saw an increase in average agricultural growth rates from 
approximately 3.0 percent in the 1990s to 2008, although Southern Africa has seen the most dramatic 
increase with a current agriculture GDP growth rate of 7.1 percent. Despite these trends, however, it is 
still not possible to know what the impact on agricultural growth rates for 2009 were from the food crisis 
of late 2007 and early 2008 and the subsequent global recession. 
Figure 16. GDP and agriculture GDP growth rates, 1990–2009 
 
Source: World Bank 2009.  
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Table 5. Agricultural performance, 1990–2007 
      Annual Agricultural GDP Growth (%) 













Burundi  -0.4  -2.5  10.9  2.5  3.4 
Comoros  2.5  4.6  -10.3  3.0  4.5 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2.1  -1.7  2.5  3.0  3.0 
Eritrea  10.1  5.4  8.8  1.3  -2.0 
Ethiopia  2.8  5.1  10.9  9.4  7.7 
Kenya  2.1  3.0  4.4  2.3  3.0 
Madagascar  1.9  1.8  2.1  2.2  2.8 
Rwanda  3.3  5.1  11.0  -3.0  11.1 
Sudan  4.8  1.8  4.4  3.1  4.0 
Tanzania  3.5  4.8  3.8  4.0  10.6 

















Angola  -1.3  13.8  9.8  21.6  27.3 
Botswana  -0.7  -1.1  -0.4  1.8  2.0 
Lesotho  1.5  -4.7  14.9  -8.6  -0.6 
Malawi  9.7  -1.5  11.9  5.9  5.2 
Mozambique  4.6  4.3  10.9  6.6  7.0 
Namibia  4.8  3.7  -0.7  -1.4  41.0 
South Africa  0.8  2.1  -7.9  0.9  1.0 
Swaziland  0.5  1.2  -2.2  2.7  2.8 
Zambia  5.1  1.0  2.2  7.2  3.3 













Benin  5.3  4.9  5.6  4.2  3.8 
Burkina Faso  6.0  6.0  2.7  -4.3  4.6 
Cameroon  4.3  3.8  3.0  3.9  4.2 
Cape Verde  1.2  0.9  3.7  5.2  4.2 
Central African Republic  3.1  1.5  3.1  3.3  2.6 
Chad  5.6  3.3  3.2  0.1  0.1 
Congo, Rep.  0.3  6.1  8.2  -1.7  5.0 
Cote d'Ivoire  3.0  2.7  1.3  1.8  3.1 
Equatorial Guinea  6.1  2.1  3.7  10.0  -1.3 
Gabon  1.7  1.6  2.1  5.3  4.8 
Gambia, The  3.3  4.7  1.0  2.0  4.6 
Ghana  2.9  3.3  1.2  0.2  5.4 
Guinea  4.5  3.6  4.2  5.0  3.9 
Guinea-Bissau  3.9  3.9  5.5  7.0  3.2 
Mali  2.9  3.0  5.7  2.4  10.0 
Mauritania  0.8  -2.8  11.7  1.9  3.8 
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Table 5. Continued 
      Annual Agricultural GDP Growth (%) 
      1990-1999  2000-2005  2006  2007  2008 
 
            Niger  3.3  3.2  8.1  4.0  8.6 
Nigeria  3.6  13.7  7.4  7.4  -0.3 
Senegal  1.8  2.5  -7.5  -5.3  12.7 
Sierra Leone  -3.4  8.3  4.3  5.7  5.9 
Togo  3.8  1.6  -3.5  5.8  1.5 
   East Africa  3.4  2.3  4.4  3.6  4.8 
   Southern Africa  2.9  1.3  3.5  3.0  7.1 
   West Africa  3.0  3.7  3.6  3.0  4.3 
   SSA  3.1  2.9  3.8  2.9  5.3 
Sources: ReSAKSS calculations based on World Bank World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009). 
These regional and subcontinental figures mask the diverse agricultural performance that exists 
across countries in Africa. Figure 17 shows that in 2008, ten countries met the CAADP’s 6 percent 
agricultural growth target: Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. Nineteen other countries attained moderate agricultural GDP growth rates of 
between 3 and 6 percent. In the same year, eight countries experienced negative growth in their 
agriculture sectors.  
Figure 17. African agriculture growth rates and the CAADP 6% target, 2008 
    
Source: World Bank 2009. 
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From 2005 to 2008, GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was generally high, at an average rate of 
5.4 percent per year. With the exception of 2009, average GDP growth rates have been increasing, from 
3.0 percent in the 1990s and 4.6 percent in the first half of the 2000s to more than 5.5 percent by 2007 
(Table 6). With the international economic slowdown, however, growth projections are less optimistic 
and “low economic growth is likely to have negative second-round effects for investment and 
productivity, with direct ramifications for food prices and food security” (von Braun 2008b). GDP growth 
rates declined slightly to 5.4 percent in 2008 and are expected to decline to 2.2 percent for 2009, which 
would mark the first time GDP has grown that slowly since 1994. 
A similar trend is echoed at the regional level. East and Central Africa and Southern Africa both 
witnessed increases in their average annual GDP growth rates from the 1990s to the early 2000s and again 
from the early 2000s to 2006 and 2007 (Table 6). West Africa also experienced an increase in regional 
average annual GDP growth from the 1990s to the early 2000s, but this increase did not continue into 
recent years. All regions are expected to see a drastic decline in GDP growth in 2009 to levels 
experienced in the 1990s due to the food and financial crises. Southern Africa is expected to witness the 
most significant decline to a GDP growth rate of 0.9 percent for 2009, down from 5.7 percent in 2008. 
Table 6. Economic performance, 1990–2009 
   
Annual GDP Growth (%) 
   













Burundi  -1.4  1.7  5.1  3.6  4.5  3.2 
Comoros  1.6  2.5  1.2  0.5  1.0  1.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -5.5  2.5  5.6  6.3  6.2  2.7 
Eritrea  8.1  0.0  -1.0  1.3  2.0  0.3 
Ethiopia  2.7  6.5  10.9  11.1  11.3  7.5 
Kenya  2.2  3.1  6.4  7.0  3.6  2.5 
Madagascar  1.6  3.0  5.0  6.2  6.9  -0.4 
Rwanda  2.1  6.7  7.3  7.9  11.2  5.3 
Sudan  4.4  6.4  11.3  10.2  8.3  4.0 
Tanzania  3.1  6.4  6.7  7.1  7.5  5.0 

















Angola  1.0  9.3  18.6  20.3  14.8  0.2 
Botswana  6.1  5.7  3.0  4.2  -1.0  -10.3 
Lesotho  3.9  3.1  8.1  5.1  3.9  -1.0 
Malawi  4.1  1.1  8.2  8.6  9.7  5.9 
Mozambique  5.6  7.4  8.7  7.0  6.5  4.3 
Namibia  4.1  4.8  7.1  4.1  2.7  -0.7 
South Africa  1.4  3.9  5.3  5.1  3.1  -2.2 
Swaziland  3.7  3.6  2.9  3.5  2.5  0.4 
Zambia  0.4  4.6  6.2  6.2  6.0  4.5 
Zimbabwe  2.6  -5.8  -  -  -  3.7 
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Table 6. Continued 
   
Annual GDP Growth (%) 
   













Benin  4.5  4.2  3.8  4.6  5.1  3.8 
Burkina Faso  5.1  5.4  5.5  3.6  4.5  3.5 
Cameroon  0.4  3.8  3.2  3.5  3.9  1.6 
Cape Verde  5.2  4.5  10.8  6.9  6.0  3.5 
Central African Republic  1.3  -0.4  4.0  4.2  2.8  2.4 
Chad  2.2  12.6  0.2  0.2  -0.4  1.6 
Congo, Rep.  0.8  4.9  6.2  -1.6  5.6  7.4 
              Cote d'Ivoire  2.6  -0.6  0.7  1.7  2.2  3.7 
Equatorial Guinea  20.2  26.1  1.3  21.4  11.3  -5.4 
Gabon  2.5  1.1  1.2  5.6  2.1  -1.0 
Gambia, The  3.1  4.5  6.5  6.3  5.9  3.6 
Ghana  4.3  4.8  6.4  6.1  6.2  4.5 
Guinea  4.3  3.0  2.2  1.5  8.4  0.0 
Guinea-Bissau  2.0  -0.8  3.5  0.6  2.7  1.9 
Mali  3.6  5.9  5.3  2.8  5.0  4.1 
Mauritania  2.6  3.7  11.7  1.9  -  2.3 
Niger  1.9  3.3  5.8  3.3  9.5  1.0 
Nigeria  3.1  6.1  6.2  6.4  5.3  2.9 
Senegal  2.7  4.5  2.4  4.7  2.5  1.5 
Sierra Leone  -4.2  12.3  7.3  6.8  5.1  4.0 
Togo  2.6  1.7  3.9  1.9  1.1  2.4 
   East Africa  2.2  3.4  7.0  7.2  7.0  3.2 
   Southern Africa  2.5  3.8  7.1  7.0  5.7  0.9 
   West Africa  3.3  5.3  4.7  4.4  4.7  2.3 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  3.0  4.6  5.7  5.5  5.4  2.2 
Source: World Bank 2009.  
Note: GDP growth for 2009 is from IMF 2009. 
Agricultural Production and Productivity 
Future growth in African agriculture will largely depend on the continent’s ability to increase agricultural 
production and productivity. Higher agricultural production on the continent can improve food security 
and dampen the effects of high international food prices on domestic markets. Due to increasingly limited 
land resources, however, increasing production largely depends on increasing agricultural productivity. 
Cereal yields in Sub-Saharan Africa have improved over time, but they are still below what is needed to 
feed a growing population (Figure 18). Using a regionwide multimarket model, a recent IFPRI study 
projects that doubling the productivity of food staples in Africa by 2015 has the potential to raise average 
GDP growth to 5.5 percent per year, to lift more than 70 million people out of poverty, and to turn Africa 
from a food-deficit region to a surplus region with 20 to 40 percent lower food prices (Diao, Fan, Headey, 
Johnson, Nin Pratt and Yu . 2008).  
28 
 
Figure 18. Cereal yields of world regions, 1961–2007 
 
Source: FAO 2009c. 
The recent food price crisis is a potential opportunity that could promote a supply response in 
agriculture. Indeed, as a result of higher food prices (see Section 2), world cereal output actually 
increased by 7 percent between 2007 and 2008 (FAO 2009b). This supply response, however, was mostly 
concentrated in developed countries; among developing countries, it was seen in Brazil, China, and India 
(FAO 2009e). Yet even in Sub-Saharan Africa, FAO projections indicate that cereal production increased 
by 14.0 percent from 2007 to 2008 (Figure 19). Within Sub-Saharan Africa, this increase was 
concentrated in Southern and West Africa, with minimal supply response occurring in East and Central 
Africa (Figure 20). However, Sub-Saharan Africa has such a low level of output compared to other world 
regions that this increase still does not put it at the same production level as the world’s major cereal 
producers. 
Global cereal output figures are expected to show a decline for 2009 as a result of falling world 
food prices, yet in Sub-Saharan Africa they are expected to increase by 0.4 percent (FAO 2009e). In part, 
this difference may have been because of the lag in high food price transmission from the international 
markets to the domestic markets in many African countries (see Section 2). In 2009, cereal production 
was projected to continue increasing, albeit at a slower rate in Southern Africa and East and Central 
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Figure 19. Cereal production in developing and developed countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
2007–2009 
 
Source: FAO 2009e.  
Figure 20. Cereal production in African regions, 2007–2009 
 
Source: FAO 2009b. 
Agricultural Trade 
Increasing agricultural production and productivity will not instigate growth and poverty reduction if 
farmers do not also have access to domestic, regional, and international markets for trade. Access to 
markets is still severely limited in Sub-Saharan Africa due to high transportation and market transaction 
costs. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been a net food importer since the 1980s (Figure 21). In 2007, the value 
of the region’s trade deficit started to increase as a result of higher food prices.   
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Figure 21. Agricultural imports and exports in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980–2006 
 
Source: FAO 2009c. 
Since the early 1990s, the continent has witnessed steadily rising agricultural and overall growth. 
However, despite recent increases in agriculture GDP growth rates in Africa’s different regions and the 
high diversity of Africa’s agroecological conditions for a wide range of agricultural production, only one 
of the three regions covered in this report (Southern Africa) has achieved the 6 percent agricultural 
growth target set by CAADP.  
Generating higher agricultural growth, particularly in the smallholder sector, would increase rural 
incomes and food supplies and stimulate broad-based economic growth through linkages with the 
nonagricultural sector. Agricultural growth, accompanied by growth in nonagriculture, can have a high 
impact on poverty reduction. There is thus a critical need to accelerate agricultural productivity if African 
agriculture is to continue performing the way it has in recent years. 
For agricultural trade, Sub-Saharan Africa has been a net food importer for decades. The 
widening food supply-demand gap and the rising food import bills have caused serious setbacks, 
especially in domestic food production, foreign exchange earnings, and labor force required in 
agriculture. This gap has also eroded the competitiveness of domestically produced agricultural goods in 
comparison with low-priced imported goods, leading to reduction in agricultural activities in the 
continent. Nevertheless, recent years have witnessed dramatic attention on African agriculture because of 
its immediate and long-term implications for Africa’s development. Since the majority of Africans are 
living in rural areas and engage in subsistence agriculture, which will long remain the main source of their 
livelihoods, it is pertinent that a renewed interest in agriculture be the main vehicle of reducing poverty in 
the continent. Therefore, while many African governments are strengthening the focus and 
implementation of the CAADP strategy through their current CAADP compacts, the strategy for 







































































































































5.  PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING MDG1 IN AFRICA  
The continent as a whole is not on track for achieving the first MDG of halving hunger and poverty by 
2015. According to our estimates, which project current hunger and poverty rates based on a “business as 
usual” scenario, the current child malnutrition rate stands at 29.3 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 
7).
6
Likewise, ReSAKSS estimates of poverty indicate that the continent as a whole is also not on 
track toward halving poverty by 2015 (Table 7). The continent’s projected poverty rate for 2009 stood at 
38.6 percent, which was 9 percentage points above the rate the continent should have reached in 2009 in 
order to be on track for meeting the 2015 target of 29.0 percent. This figure was based on a “business as 
usual” scenario, and thus it does not allow for the effects of sudden shocks, such as the global economic 
crisis, which has likely increased poverty drastically. According to the United Nations (2009a), the 
number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide in 2009 was expected to be 55 million to 90 
million more than anticipated before the current economic crisis; a large share of that population—
approximately 16 million—was in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 This rate is an increase from the last measured rate of 27.0 percent in 2008 and is likely to be an 
overly optimistic estimate, because it does not take into account the crises of the past year. According to 
the United Nations, the decline in hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 reversed in 2008, largely due 
to the increase in food prices (United Nations 2009a).  
Table 7. Child malnutrition rates (weight for age) and 2009 MDG1 benchmarks 





rate for 2009 
2009 
Benchmark 
On track to 
halve hunger by 
2015? 
Algeria  2006  3.7  2.5  5.8  yes 
Angola  2001  30.5  20.1  27.8  yes 
Benin  2006  22.6  20.6  20.6  yes 
Botswana  2000  12.5  2.2  14.9  yes 
Burkina Faso  2006  37.4  38.5  19.6  no 
Burundi  2005  39.2  34.5  35.3  yes 
C. African Rep.  2006  28.5  38.2  16.6  no 
Cameroon  2004  19.3  20.4  8.2  no 
Chad  2004  36.7  35.2  25.4  no 
Comoros  2004  24.9  27.4  11.2  no 
Congo, D.R.  2007  31.4  30.9  22.1  no 
Congo, R.  2005  14.4  14.7  8.2  no 
Cote d'Ivoire  2006  20.2  19.3  15.5  no 
Djibouti  2006  28.9  30.0  14.2  no 
Egypt  2008  7.5  7.4  6.4  no 
Eritrea  2002  39.6  38.5  25.7  no 
Ethiopia  2005  38.4  35.6  30.4  no 
Gambia  2006  20.3  18.5  18.5  yes 
Ghana  2008  13.9  13.0  18.7  yes 
Guinea  2005  25.8  27.5  12.0  no 
                                                       
6 ReSAKSS estimates for poverty rates are calculated using data from World Bank (2009) and United Nations (2009a). 
ReSAKSS calculates the average annual rate of change between years for which data is available and uses this rate to project the 
current rate assuming this rate of change stayed the same. This projection is referred to as a “business as usual” scenario.  
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Table 7. Continued 





rate for 2009 
2009 
Benchmark 
On track to 
halve hunger by 
2015? 
Guinea Bissau  2006  19.4  16.0  21.3  yes 
Kenya  2003  19.9  18.5  14.3  no 
Lesotho  2005  16.6  17.9  9.7  no 
Liberia  2007  23.8  23.2  18.2  no 
Madagascar  2004  41.9  43.1  24.0  no 
Malawi  2006  20.5  19.1  17.5  no 
Mali  2006  31.7  29.2  27.9  no 
Mauritania  2007  29.8  27.6  30.2  yes 
Morocco  2004  10.2  10.7  5.5  no 
Mozambique  2003  23.7  21.2  18.0  no 
Namibia  2007  17.5  16.3  17.0  yes 
Niger  2006  44.4  44.8  26.3  no 
Nigeria  2003  28.7  25.5  22.1  no 
Rwanda  2005  22.5  20.4  18.7  no 
Sao Tome and Principe  2006  9.2  7.4  11.8  yes 
Senegal  2005  17.3  16.0  13.8  no 
Sierra Leone  2005  30.4  33.0  12.9  no 
Somalia  2006  35.6  41.5  2.7  no 
South Africa  2003  11.5  13.3  4.8  no 
SSA  2008  27.0  29.3  19.9  no 
Sudan  2006  31.0  30.2  21.8  no 
Tanzania  2005  21.8  19.6  18.5  no 
Togo  2006  26.0  28.1  9.2  no 
Uganda  2006  20.4  19.0  17.2  no 
Zambia  2007  19.3  18.7  15.3  no 
Zimbabwe  2006  14.0  17.0  9.4  no 
Source: World Bank 2009 and UN 2009a.  
Note: Current rates are ReSAKSS estimates based on “business as usual.” 2009 Benchmark rate refers to the rate the country 
would have to achieve for 2009 if it were on track for halving child malnutrition by 2015. 
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Table 8. Poverty rates by country and 2009 MDG1 benchmarks 
  Most recent 
poverty rates 
Year  ReSAKSS estimated 
rate for 2009 
2009 MDG 
Benchmark 
On track to halve 
poverty by 2015? 
Algeria  -  -  -  4.2  - 
Angola  54.3  2000  -  -  - 
Benin  47.3  2003  35.3  14.5  no 
Botswana  -  -  -  19.3  - 
Burkina Faso  56.5  2003  46.7  48.2  yes 
Burundi  81.3  2006  80.7  52.5  no 
Cameroon  32.8  2001  2.9  45.8  yes 
Cape Verde  20.6  2001  -  -  - 
Central African Republic  62.4  2003  50.2  55.1  yes 
Chad  61.9  2003  -  -  yes 
Comoros  46.1  2004  -  -  - 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  59.2  2006  -  -  - 
Congo, Rep.  54.1  2005  -  -  - 
Cote d'Ivoire  24.1  1998  27.6  9.9  no 
Djibouti  18.8  2002  35.1  3.0  no 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.0  2000  1.8  1.8  yes 
Ethiopia  39.0  2005  30.4  44.2  yes 
Gabon  4.8  2005  -  -  - 
Gambia*  61.3  2003  59.8  40.0  no 
Ghana  30.0  2006  25.5  33.6  yes 
Guinea  70.1  2003  58.9  58.6  yes 
Guinea-Bissau  48.8  2002  53.6  25.2  no 
Kenya  19.6  1997  13.9  25.6  yes 
Lesotho  43.4  2003  35.6  37.4  yes 
Liberia  84.0  2007  -  -  - 
Madagascar  76.3  2001  66.2  45.7  no 
Malawi  73.9  2004  66.2  59.1  no 
Mali  51.4  2006  42.7  60.6  yes 
Mauritania  21.2  2000  38.0  32.3  no 
Morocco  6.2  2001  2.5  1.5  no 
Mozambique  74.7  2003  68.1  55.2  no 
Niger  65.9  2005  63.8  45.8  no 
Nigeria  64.4  2004  93.7  27.9  no 
Rwanda*  60.3  2000  72.0  29.3  no 
Senegal  44.2  2001  25.3  27.2  yes 
Sierra Leone  53.4  2003  49.1  38.9  no 
South Africa  10.7  2001  28.6  14.6  no 
Swaziland  62.8  2001  41.7  56.9  yes 
Tanzania*  35.7  2001  33.4  42.5  yes 
Togo  38.7  2006  -  -  - 
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Table 8. Continued 
  Most recent 
poverty rates 
Year  ReSAKSS estimated 
rate for 2009 
2009 MDG 
Benchmark 
On track to halve 
poverty by 2015? 
Tunisia  2.6  2000  8.2  3.7  no 
Uganda  60.5  1999  45.8  45.2  no 
Zambia  62.1  1996  64.9  38.9  no 
Zimbabwe*  34.9  1996  58.6  14.9  no 
SSA  41.1  2004  38.6  29.0  no 
Source: World Bank 2009. Note: 2009 poverty rates are ReSAKSS estimates based on “business as usual” scenarios. 2009 
Benchmark rate refers to the rate the country would have to achieve for 2009 if it were on track for halving child malnutrition by 
2015.  
This SSA continental picture masks the varied performance of different regions and countries in 
meeting the MDG1 targets. Figure 22 indicates that several countries are on track to achieve either the 
hunger or the poverty target of MDG1. Thirteen countries are on track to halve poverty by 2015 while 
eleven are on track for meeting the hunger goal. However, only one country – Ghana – is on track to 
halving both components of MDG1.   
Figure 22. Countries on track for meeting MDG1 based on “business as usual” projections 
 
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank 2009. 
Increasing Agricultural Growth for Poverty Reduction 
ReSAKSS helped facilitate a number of country studies in Africa. These studies provide evidence that 
supports the argument that increasing agricultural growth to achieve CAADP’s 6 percent agricultural 
growth target can have significant beneficial effects on poverty, food security, and overall economic 




 briefly displays the results of these ReSAKSS country studies. Most countries will need to 
increase agricultural growth beyond 6 percent in order to halve poverty by 2015. The annual growth rate 
of agricultural expenditures required to merely achieve a 6 percent annual agricultural growth rate is quite 
                                                       
7 See, for instance, Benin, Thurlow, Diao, Kalinda and Kalinda 2008 or Thurlow 2008.  
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significant. Therefore, most of these countries will need to dramatically increase their investment 
allocations to agriculture if they plan to achieve the CAADP growth rate or MDG goals. The studies also 
found that focusing on staple crops, especially cereals, as well as some export crops, can have a much 
higher effect on both growth and poverty reduction. 
Table 9. Results of CAADP and MDG scenarios 




Will CAADP 6% Ag 
growth put country 
on track to halve 




required to halve 
poverty by 2015 
Annual growth rate of public 
agricultural spending to achieve 
CAADP 6% agriculture growth 




Ghana  Yes  N/A but will put Ghana 
on track to middle-
income country status. 
Current average is 
4.2% 
     
Malawi  No  No  6.90%  19.30%  26.30% 
Mozambique  No  Yes  6%       
Rwanda  No  No  9%  15.20%  30.30% 
Uganda  No  N/A but will lead to 
higher poverty 
reduction and reverse 
trend of increasing 
absolute number of 
people in poverty. 
Current average is 
2.7% 
25.30%  30.00% 
Zambia  No  No  9.20%  7.20%  26.50% 
Sources: Breisinger, Diao, Thurlow, and Al-Hassan 2008; Benin, Thurlow, Diao, Kalinda and Kalinda 2008; Benin, Thurlow, 
Diao, Kebba and Owfono 2008; Benin, Thurlow, Diao, McCool and Simtowe 2008; Diao, Fan, Kanyarukiga and Yu . 2008.  
Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia 
Three countries in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) region—Malawi, 
Rwanda and Zambia—serve as good examples of the significant benefits that achieving the CAADP’s 
target agricultural growth rate can bring, even when these targets do not translate into poverty reduction 
in line with MDG1. 
For example, achieving the 6 percent target will substantially reduce the number of people living 
below the poverty line by 2015. In Zambia, national poverty would fall from 68 to 52 percent by 2015, 
whereas in Malawi it would fall from 47 to 35 percent. Even more impressive poverty reduction would 
occur in Rwanda—from 59 percent to 42 percent by 2015. These results will be feasible if the countries 
realize reasonably ambitious improvements in crop yields and subsector growth. 
These benefits would result even though all three countries will fall short of achieving the MDG1 
target of halving poverty by 2015 and will actually witness an increase in the absolute number of poor 
people. In all three cases, the 6 percent agricultural growth target is also insufficient to elicit the scale of 
poverty reduction necessary to meet MDG1. To do so, the sector would need to grow by approximately 9 
percent per year in Rwanda and Zambia and by 6.9 percent per year in Malawi.  




Like Rwanda, Malawi, and Zambia, Mozambique’s current growth path does not put it on track to 
achieve MDG1. However, achieving the CAADP’s 6 percent agricultural growth rate target will allow 
Mozambique to reach the MDG1 goal of halving poverty by 2015. Reaching this target is feasible, as 
Mozambique already has strong agricultural performance and therefore will require less additional growth 
in crop production. In fact, with the right investments, Mozambique could surpass the CAADP target and 
reach an average agricultural growth rate of 6.6 percent from 2006 to 2015. This growth would increase 
overall GDP growth from 6.3 to 7.0 percent per year, would reduce national poverty to 32.6 percent by 
2015, and would lift an additional 1 million people above the poverty line by 2015. Under the CAADP 
scenario, Mozambique would meet MDG1 sometime in 2014. 
Ghana and Uganda 
Ghana is already on track to achieving MDG1, even though it is not currently achieving the CAADP 
target of 6 percent annual agricultural growth. Achieving an accelerated agricultural growth of 6 percent 
per year would have a significant impact on poverty reduction in Ghana and Uganda. In Uganda, the 
poverty rate will be halved sometime before 2015; however, due to an increasing population, there will 
actually be a larger absolute number of people in poverty. Accelerating agricultural growth would reverse 
this trend and lift an additional 2.9 million Ugandans above the poverty line. In Ghana, 6 percent 
agricultural growth would put the country on track to becoming a middle-income country by 2015 and 
would also reduce the number of people in poverty. Therefore, even for countries set to meet MDG1, 
CAADP can further facilitate income growth and poverty reduction. 
What Impact Will the Recent Food Crisis Have on Poverty and Hunger Reduction? 
Having reviewed recent performance in the agricultural sector and resource commitments, it is clear that 
progress has been made. However, has it been enough to enable countries to move closer to the CAADP 
targets and MDG1, especially in the current international economic context?  
The recent food price crisis may have set back earlier progress toward poverty and hunger 
reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. High and volatile food prices threaten the nutrition and food security of 
the poor, because they erode the already limited purchasing power of those people (von Braun 2008a). 
The proportion of undernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 1 percent in 2007 due to the 
increased food prices. This represents a change from 1995–1997, when the proportion of undernourished 
people decreased by 4 percent, and from 2003–2005, when the proportion only marginally increased 
(FAO 2008). Most farmers in Africa are net buyers of food; in the face of such high food prices, they 
must shift their spending away from education and healthcare, or even sanitation and heating, toward 
food, of which they must consume a lower quality and quantity. In other countries, the poor have had to 
make major shifts in their livelihood strategies. For example, in Mauritania, goatherds have been forced to 
sell their livestock for money to buy food, resulting in both a livestock glut in the market (and thus 
unusually low prices) and an erosion in families’ livelihoods, because their main source of sustenance is 
gone (Faiola 2008). 
The financial crisis may have exacerbated this situation for many poor people by shrinking 
employment and further lowering real wages. These changes further reduce the amount of income 
available to spend on food, resulting in worsening malnutrition. At the same time, funding for social 
protection and food aid programs, which protect many of the most vulnerable from slipping into 
starvation, are limited due to the credit crunch. Furthermore, the coping strategies employed by the poor 
in Africa may have increased their vulnerability, as many had to sell off what little productive assets they 
owned. 
In 2008, a range of scientific studies attempted to assess the impacts of rising food prices on 
household poverty, including Ivanic and Martin’s (2008) 9-country study, Zezza et al.’s (2008) 11-
country study, Wodon et al.’s (2008) study of 12 West African countries, and Dessus et al.’s (2008) study  
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of the urban sector of 73 developing countries. Because none of these experiments incorporated actual 
price changes, their simulations tell us who would be vulnerable to rising prices, but not which 
populations are actually experiencing hardship as a result of rising food prices. This is an important 
caveat because, as we have seen, food price inflation has varied greatly across countries.  
Figure 23 shows the results from Ivanic and Martin (2008), depicting the impact on rural and 
urban poverty of a food inflation rate of 10 percent. The authors found that under this scenario, rural 
poverty increases by three times as much as urban poverty in Zambia, almost twice as much in Malawi, 
and about seven times as much in Madagascar. One quite worrying finding to come out of this research is 
that a surprising number of African households seem to be net consumers of food, even though they are 
residing in rural areas and are presumably involved in agriculture. Since poor households often produce 
food as well as consume it, the impact of food inflation on household welfare depends on whether a 
household is a net food consumer or a net food producer. Rising food prices will hit net-consuming 
households adversely but the size of the impact will vary according to the degree to which the households 
are net consumers of food. The results from the studies listed above imply that many agricultural 
producers in Africa’s rural areas are producing too little, or have too low of productivity, to have enough 
surplus to sell. 
Clearly, a range of factors influences the vulnerability of households to rising food prices within 
and across countries. Zezza et al. (2008) go further than the other simulation studies by disaggregating 
vulnerability across groups. In 13 developing countries around the developing world, the authors found 
that the most vulnerable households have the following characteristics: they are urban or rural nonfarm; 
the families are larger and less educated; they are more dependent on female labor; they are less well 
served by infrastructure; and, within the rural sector, they have limited access to land and modern 
agricultural inputs. The authors also found that reductions in welfare are highest among the poorest 
households, a result driven by the higher food shares in the budgets of poor households and their low 
levels of food production. 
Figure 23. Increase in US$ per day poverty headcount after a 10% increase in food prices, by 
region 
 
Source: Ivanic and Martin 2008. 















































To summarize, these studies suggest that poverty (including rural poverty) will generally increase 
in the short run if food prices rise substantially. Zezza et al. (2008) offered further insights into which 
types of households are most vulnerable to rising food prices. It is important to remember the limitations 
of these simulations. Actual food inflation rates vary substantially across countries. In addition, fuel 
inflation can have a large impact on household welfare, not least because fuel inflation has large adverse 
multiplier effects on a number of sectors in the economy, including the food sector (Arndt et al. 2008). 
We also still need to learn more about the effects that the 2008 food crisis had on malnutrition, especially 
since even relatively short increases in malnutrition can have long-lasting effects on childhood health and 
education outcomes.  
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6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has summarized the trends exhibited in Africa’s agriculture sector during the recent past. 
Overall, progress has been made in most areas of Africa’s agricultural development. However, the 
setbacks from the food price crisis, followed immediately by the financial crisis, are still not completely 
clear, due to a slow transmission of these effects into domestic markets and varied responses.  
There has been growing momentum toward putting agriculture firmly on the agenda of both 
governments and donors. The increased attention to agriculture’s role in development, as well as the 
critical need to increase financial and technical support to agriculture, has led to an increase in 
government and donor commitments to the sector. Yet, as this report has shown, these pledges have yet to 
translate into increased spending in the majority of African countries. Only eight countries have met the 
CAADP’s 10 percent budgetary allocation to agriculture. Thus, governments and donors will not only 
need to increase their financial commitments to agriculture in general terms, but will also need to 
carefully select policy, growth, and investment options that will reduce poverty and catalyze overall 
economic growth. In addition, countries will have to focus on the efficiency and quality of investments in 
order to ensure that allocated funds are being used effectively and are targeted to areas with the highest 
returns, such as rural infrastructure, agriculture research and development, and irrigation.  
Agricultural policies and programs must now take into consideration the complex combinations 
of factors, such as more volatile food markets and prices, market distortions, and climate change. To do 
so, we recommend a two-level approach that focuses on (1) short-term coping strategies that protect the 
poor without distorting the domestic food economy and (2) long-term “resilience” measures that allow 
farmers to take advantage of production incentives while also stabilizing the economy to prevent 
vulnerability to future crises and price variability. Donors can assist by “helping African countries meet 
the higher foreign exchange and budgetary resource requirements, while avoiding distortionary 
interventions in the sector” (Badiane 2008, 4).  
It is important to emphasize the significance of continued and increased investments in the 
agricultural sector in order to avoid the return of the food crisis with a vengeance. In the new international 
economic environment, if agricultural investments taper off due to shrinking available credit, food 
production will contract even further, which could lead to future food price spikes (von Braun 2008a). 
This time, however, because poor people are making lower wages (due to the reduced production that 
accompanies a recession), the effects will be more severe. If, however, agricultural investments are 
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